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‘A complex weapon makes the strong stronger, while a simple weapon – so long 





Shortly after midnight on June 19th 2017, Darren Osbourne, a heavy-drinking, 47-year-old  
resident of Pentwyn, Cardiff, deliberately swerved a rented white Luton panel van into a crowd of 
people outside the Finsbury Park Mosque, North London. The victims, a group of Muslim men who 
had just left the Mosque after attending Ramadan night-time prayers, were gathered together  assist 
a passer-by who had collapsed on the pavement outside. Even without this distraction, it is doubtful 
the mosque-goers could have avoided the attack; su h was the innocuous ubiquity of Osbourne’s 
indiscriminate but deadly weapon. Osbourne’s intentions, however, were anything but innocuous.1 
After his automotive missile came to a halt against some nearby bollards, he leapt from the cab and,
wild-eyed and sweating, shouted ‘I’m going to kill all Muslims – I did my bit’, before declaring his 
actions were revenge ‘for London Bridge’ (Pasha-Robinson 2017).2  
 
In the days following the attack the press struggled to make sense of Osbourne’s rapid descent into 
extremism. Certainly, his biography provided few clues as to what had motivated him to undertake the 
attack. We do know he was deeply affected by recent Islamic State-inspired terrorist attacks – 
including two involving vehicle-ramming incidents.3 But what is equally clear is that, prior to his 
decision to attack the mosque, Osbourne had no history of – or even interest in - violent extremism. 
Indeed, described variously by his sister, Nicola, as someone who was ‘not interested in terrorism’ or 
even politics in general (‘He wouldn’t even know who the Prime Minister is’), and by his drinking 
partners as ‘a loveable mentalist’, the picture of Osbourne that surfaced was of a ‘shouty’ but normal 
                                                          
1 One person was killed and twenty injured in the Osbourne attack. 
2 On 3/6/2017 three Islamic State supporters drove a rented van into pedestrians on London Bridge. After their 
van was disabled, the men made their way to a nearby market and carried out a frenzied knife attack that left 
eight dead and 48 injured. 
3 In the days leading up to the Mosque incident Osbourne had ;ﾉﾉWｪWSﾉ┞ けｴ┌ヴﾉWS ｷﾐゲ┌ﾉデゲ ;デ ｴｷゲ Aゲｷ;ﾐ ﾐWｷｪｴHﾗ┌ヴげゲ 
12-year-ﾗﾉS ゲﾗﾐげが ;ﾐS デｴW ﾐｷｪｴデ prior to the attack he was thrown out of his local pub for making threats 




‘family man’ (Ward et al 2017) – ‘Troubled, but not a racist’ (Mortimer 2017). Even those who 
disliked Osbourne appeared shocked by his actions; one of his more forthcoming Pentwyn neighbours 
commenting ‘He’s always been a complete c***, but this is really surprising’ (ibid). Such quotes are 
typical of the narrative of bewilderment that quickly emerges in the wake of egregious (Western) 
terrorist incidents. For decades, it was standard reportorial protocol for journalists to write that serial 
killers were always “quiet neighbours” who “kept themselves to themselves”. In recent years, a 
similar cliché now commonly depicts errorists as “non-descript”, “normal”, even “fun-loving” 
individuals who exhibited no prior evidence of the violence to come.  
 
Such reportage is not, however, without foundation. O e of the most robust and oft-repeated research 
findings within the discipline of terrorism studies is that, rather than suffering from any profound 
psychopathology, ‘the outstanding characteristic of terrorists is their normality’ (Crenshaw, 1981:390; 
Corrado, 1981; Silke, 1998). This ‘ordinariness’ finding was a necessary rejoinder to the common 
misconception of terrorists as “crazies” or psychopaths, but at the same time it marked the end of the 
search for anything as identifiable as a distinct terrorist ‘personality type’.4 This does not mean that 
terrorism scholars have failed to produce any valuable insights into terrorist behavior. On the 
contrary, there exists a veritable mass of excellent (post facto) psycho-sociological scholarship n the 
terrorist actor (see e.g. Horgan, 2005; Post, 2007; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011; Gill, 2016). 
Instead, it is simply to point out that it remains difficult to extrapolate out from the individual, psycho-
biographical level to make wider points that can be used to improve security and enhance detection. 
This problem is especially apparent with vehicle ramming, a phenomenon marked by a surprising 
diversity of perpetrators (in terms of their ideologies, biographies, and geographical locations). It is 
largely for this reason that, in the analysis of the vehicle ramming attack (VRA) that follows, we have 
chosen to focus not on the perpetrator per se, but on a very different, and much-neglected, aspect of 
terrorism: the terrorist act itself. In this case, the specific phenomenon of purposely driving a vehicle 
into groups of civilians or police/military personnel.  
 
In criminology, of course, there is nothing new about training attention exclusively on the criminal 
act. In fact, since the 1980s, situational crime preventionists have done precisely that; downplaying 
any interest in offender motivation and stressing instead the importance of the criminal event itself 
and the situational factors that influence its commission (e.g. Cornish and Clarke 1986). The explicit 
goal of this ‘administrative criminology’, then and now, remains beguilingly straightforward: to 
                                                          
4 Tｴｷゲ デWﾐSWﾐI┞ デﾗ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾐ デｴW け┘ｴ┞ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐげ H┌デ ﾗﾐ デｴW けｴﾗ┘ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐげ ｷゲ ﾐﾗ┘ ┗Wヴ┞ ﾏ;ヴﾆWS ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ 
terrorism studies. In particular, the issue of process (as opposed to a specific personality trait or biographical 
けデ┌ヴﾐｷﾐｪ ヮﾗｷﾐデげぶ ｷゲ ゲWWﾐ ;ゲ WゲヮWIｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾏヮﾗヴデ;ﾐデ ┘ｴWﾐ ｷデ IﾗﾏWゲ デﾗ けヴ;SｷI;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげ ;ﾐS けSW-ヴ;SｷI;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげき 
discourses that, as Sedgwick (2010), has pointed out, emerged as a ゲﾗヴデ ﾗa けｴﾗﾉ┞ ｪヴ;ｷﾉ of national security 




implement practical, cost-effective crime control measures that will bring about a quantifiable 
reduction in the overall rate of specific crimes. Nothing wrong with this of course, but our rati nale 
for focusing attention on the criminal/terrorist event does not stem from a situational perspective – 
although obviously we hope the theoretical analysis of VRAs presented here will help preventionists 
better combat the phenomenon in the future. Instead, our interest in vehicle ramming is due to its 
growing appeal as a simplistic but potent means of doing terrorism – of performing an act of violence 
against civilians for political or symbolic purposes. Vehicle ramming is a cheap but extremely 
effective way of inducing fear, promoting an ideological message, or just simply wreaking destruction 
for any number of personal reasons, suicide included. It is perhaps for this reason that ramming 
attacks are now being conducted by such a wide array of perpetrators. Yet the fact that VRAs are easy 
to carry out and impossible to predict does not explain why they have become so prevalent over the 
last year or so. It is this particular aspect of the vehicle-ramming event that interests us. Why, given 
the mass availability of automobiles for many decades around the world, have these motorised crimes 
suddenly been adopted by everyone from committed Islamic State-affiliated Jihadists, to ‘lone-wolf’ 
Palestinians and other Muslims with no previous links to organised terrorist groups, to anti-Muslim 
extremists, to American right-wing Christians, to unbalanced members of the public at large? 
  
In a bid to answer this question, the paper will proceed in three parts. Part one provides some 
historical and geographical context in the form of a short genealogy of VRAs that traces (and 
statistically documents) two recent steep rises in ramming incidents; a first pulse that took place in 
Jerusalem and the West Bank between 2015-2016; and a second ong ing ‘wave of vehicular terror’ 
that started in 2016 and is currently affecting Europe and North America. In p rt two we address the 
most common extant explanations for the rise of global ramming attacks. For example, we consider 
the publication of a series of articles in Al Qaeda and Islamic State online propaganda magazines that 
discuss and actively encourage VRAs in the name of Jihad. However, as our analysis will show, while 
relevant to the situation, the idea that these two publications can somehow account for the recen  spike 
in VRAs (as is often suggested in the media) is too reductive. If , as we suggest, standard 
rationalisations for VRAs are problematic, what other factors might have contributed to he rapid 
increase in what was once an extremely rare form of violence? We set ourselves this task in the final 
part of the article. 
 
Inspired by the social theory of Gabriel Tarde (2012/1895, 1903, 2010/1888), part three introduces the 
concepts of ‘contagion’, ‘imitation’, and the ‘mimetic’, and assesses their value in terms of 
understanding the current spate of VRAs. More specifically, we assert that, as a result of the intensely 
connected and networked nature of contemporary society, at least some of the explanatory focus 
should now be trained on the terrorist act itself as something with a seductive appeal and force all of 




imitated by a varied array of subjects who in turn are animated by a diverse set of motivations, 
psychologies and ideologies. After a general consideration of Tarde’s imitation-based approach to the 
social world, the final part divides into three brief subsections that each illustrate how his thinking can 
be used to understand some of the prominent features associated with the VRA: i) the sudden, wave-
like growth and diffusion of the act of vehicle ramming; ii) its enactment by a diverse set of 
(predominantly) ‘lone-actor’ terrorists; and iii) the influence of contemporary mediascapes in the 
sudden lurch towards political violence that is a common feature of vehicle rammers. In conclusion, 
we assert that Tarde’s work is likely to be of considerable use when it comes to analysing subsequent 
trend-like pulses in terrorist modus operandi. 
 
A brief history of the vehicle ramming attack 
 
In his typically engaging book Buda’s Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb, Mike Davis 
documents what he describes as ‘the irreversible globalization of car-bombing’. Likening the ‘steep, 
almost exponential’ rise of vehicle-born bombing in the final third of the twentieth century to ‘an 
implacable virus’ that inserted itself into a ‘host society’, Davis claims that ‘the most dramatic impact 
of the car bomb has been precisely its enfranchisement of marginal actors in modern history’ 
(2007:11). While the bloody violence and territorial reach associated with the car bomb far exceeds 
that of the VRA, it is difficult not to also note some striking similarities. To start with, like its more 
explosive counterpart, VRAs also seem to have something of a virus-like quality. For example, in the 
last four years, the VRA has transitioned from being a relatively rare occurrence, to become, by 2016, 
the most lethal form of terror attack in Western countries, claiming just over half of all terrorism-
related deaths in the West that year.5 (Importantly, these figures do not include the growing number of 
ramming incidents in North America and Europe that have been classified as ‘non-terrorist’ in origin). 
The two terror tactics are also similar in that, by transforming a bland, everyday object into a lethal, 
semi-strategic weapon, they empower marginal actors by providing them with the means to strike at 
the heart of urban centres and sow fear in the wider society. Finally, although both techniques are 
frequently employed by well-organised terrorist groups, neither method is exclusive to terrorism (nor 
as we have seen above, to Islamist terrorism). Instead, both acts have a history of being adopted, 
adapted and transformed by groups and perpetrators coming from a variety of religious and non-
religious backgrounds and ethnicities - including so-called ‘lone-wolf’ actors, as exemplified by the 
Osbourne case above.6 Given such similarities, it would seem instructive to follow Davis’s lead and 
undertake a brief history of the VRA. 
                                                          
5 Terrorist casualties in Western countries in 2016: vehicular: 99 killed, 502 injured; bombing: 32 killed, 330 
injured; shooting: 51 killed, 61 injured; stabbing: 7 killed, 27 injured (Lazo 2017). 
6 The term けﾉﾗﾐW ┘ﾗﾉaげ ｷゲ ; ゲ┌HﾃWIデ ﾗa debate (Schuurman et al, 2018). However, we adopt the position of Hamm 





To understand more about the nature of VRAs we created a database of 119 such attacks from 1999 to 
the present. The primary source for this database was the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism Global Terrorism Database (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/). 
However, due to certain limitations,7 we supplemented the sample with information drawn from the 
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-
incidents.html), as well as further examples from our own media searchs. Inclusion in the database 
required the following criteria to be met: 
 
1. A vehicle had to be used as a weapon on pedestrians or populated vehicles. 
2. The vehicle had to be the primary weapon. Any other weapons used (knives, firearms) could  
 only be used when the vehicle was disabled and not part of an ‘armed assault’ or ‘car bomb’. 
3. The incident was not part of a kidnapping attempt. 
4. Pedestrian casualties were intended, and not part of a chase, evasion or accident. 
5. The vehicle was not used primarily for demolition. 
 
This yielded a database of 125 attacks from 1/1/1999-31/12/ 2017, and a pattern demonstrated in 
Figures 1 and 2 below: 
 
[INSERT Figure 1 here] 
 
Here is the distribution separated for location of either Western Europe/North America, Middle
East/North Africa, Rest of the world: 
 
[INSERT Figure 2 here] 
 
The Figures demonstrate a sporadic history of VRAs in different parts of the world up until 2014. At 
that point, a rise in ramming incidents occurs, beginning with a wave of attacks in the Middle East 
(almost exclusively in Israel and the West Bank, see Figure 2), which, by the end of 2015, becomes 
quite dramatic. This is followed by a second spike starting in 2015 across North America and Western
Europe (Figure 2). Let us look at each in turn. 
 
‘The intifada of the individuals’ 
                                                          
ﾗヮヮﾗゲWS デﾗ デｴﾗゲW I;ヴヴｷWS ﾗ┌デ ﾗﾐ デｴW ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デWヴヴﾗヴｷゲデ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗヴ ゲデ;デW HﾗSｷWゲげく AIIﾗヴSｷﾐｪﾉ┞が けTｴW ﾉﾗﾐW ┘ﾗﾉa 
ｷゲ ゲﾗﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ H┞ ﾐ;デ┌ヴWぐ ;ﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｴｷゲ ﾗヴ ｴWヴ ヴ;SｷI;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐ デﾗ ;Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾏ;┞ HW ゲヮ┌ヴヴWS H┞ ┗ｷﾗﾉWﾐデ ｷﾏ;ｪWゲが ｷﾐIWﾐSｷ;ヴ┞ 
Hﾗﾗﾆゲが ﾏ;ﾐｷaWゲデﾗゲが ;ﾐS a;デ┘;ゲげ ふｷHｷSぎヵぶく 
7 Detailed records of incidents are not provided before 1999, and the database does not include 2017. In 
;SSｷデｷﾗﾐが デｴW S;デ;H;ゲW ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ｷﾐIﾉ┌SWゲ ｷﾐIｷSWﾐデゲ デｴ;デ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ﾃ┌SｪWS デﾗ HW けデWヴヴﾗヴｷゲﾏげく Fﾗヴ ﾗ┌ヴ ヮ┌ヴヮﾗゲWゲが ┘W 





When examined more closely, the 2015 spike in ramming attacks in Israel and the West Bank can be 
seen as part of a larger wave of violence known as ‘The wave of terror’ (Ostrovsky 2015), or ‘The 
intifada of the individuals’ (Nashashibi 2015; David 2016; Pfeffer 2016; Ackerman 2015). In Israel, 
military officials now use both appellations to describe a spontaneous escalation in unsophisticated, 
‘lone-wolf’ DIY attacks by Palestinians on Israelis that involved knives and other sharp-edged 
instruments (cleavers, screwdrivers etc.), but also – more unusually - vehicular ramming. Indeed, 
during this time, ramming itself went from a rare occurrence to the second most common form of 
attack in Israel and the West Bank (Eglash et al 2016). 
 
Commentary on both sides of the conflict attributed this unforeseen ‘wave’ of terror to a well-
established list of causes: poor economic conditions among Palestinian youth, lack of progress in the 
peace negotiations, and conflicts over Israeli access to the Temple Mount. But while initially there 
was an all-too-familiar feel to both the attacks and the explanatory commentary, it quickly emerged 
that certain aspects of this latest pulse of attacks marked it out as different from previous intifadas. To 
start with, many of the attacks during this period were carried out by so-called ‘lone-wolf’ assailants; 
individuals with no previous history of violent political behaviour and no established association with 
existing terrorist organisations. In the words of Sharif Nashashibi (2015), such is the level of the 
Palestinians’ exasperation, ‘they are rising up as individuals rather than as a collective mass (out of 
necessity, not choice), without the relative safety of numbers and the backing of their leaders’.  
 
Second, it appeared that the attackers’ motivation for violence was also more varied and personal than 
in other periods of the conflict. In other words, as Pfeffer makes clear in the following quotation, 
while all expressed frustration with the plight of Palestine, the triggering factor was often as much 
personal as it was political or ideological: 
 
The attackers have a social media presence, usually on Facebook but also on Twitter and Instagram. 
Analysis of their behaviour online has yielded profiles of potential attackers and, in many cases, also 
the additional motivations for a suicide attack. Often these are personal and non-ideol gical reasons 
such as debt or forced marriage. In many cases, Israeli security services believe th  real motivation 
behind attacks was the desire for "suicide by IDF", attaining the status of martyrdom and sparing 
family embarrassment. (Pfeffer 2016)  
 
These two points are empirically substantiated in a recent study by Perry, Hasisi and Perry (2017). 
Drawing on a database supplied by the Israeli Security Agency, Perry and his colleagues examined 62 
VRAs perpetrated by ‘lone terrorists’ in Israel and the West Bank between January 2000 and March 
2016. They point out that none of the 62 acts were committed by a terrorist organisation, and that only 
14.5% of the sample had previously engaged in terrorist activity. They also stressed that, while over 




were affected by the political situation around them), in many cases political events shrouded or wer 
used to justify other unrelated personal grievances.8  
 
Finally, as Ackerman makes clear, many of the attacks associated with ‘the intifada of the individuals’ 
were unsophisticated, unpredictable and, interestingly, very hastily planned, using simple ‘DIY’ 
weapons (typically knives and vehicles).  
 
These types of terrorist attacks cannot be detected ahead of time, as there is no planni g or strategy 
behind them. As a result, the security forces have no way of preventing them. In these cases, 
intelligence gathering does not give us an advantage… When lone-wolf attacks succeed, other 
individuals think to themselves, “Hey, I can do that too.” (Ackerman 2015) 
 
Importantly, it is not simply that more successful Israeli security measures have created a situation 
where only knives and cars are available (as is sometimes claimed, see below). Instead, it is 
symptomatic of the style of the attack, one lacking in organisation and planning (Beaumont 2015). A 
style that is perhaps inspiring simply because it is so easy to repeat. 
 
Ripple Effect: Beyond the West Bank and into the West 
 
While VRAs and other related forms of violence associated with the intifada of the individuals peaked 
in 2015 (and actually started to decline in Israel and the West Bank by the end of 2016), we can 
clearly see from Figure 2 that, by late 2016, ramming incidents had started to spread to other regins –
most notably Europe and North America. For example, by the end of 2017 (a year not currently 
covered by the Global Terrorism Database), there had already been many more VRAs in Western 
cities (32) than in the West Bank and Jerusalem (10). In large part this increase in Western attacks can 
be attributed to a spate of spectacular and deadly terrorist actions by Islamic State-inspired supporters. 
Consider, for example, the following high profile VRAs undertaken by jihadists in the last 12 months 
of the sample: 
 
 19 December 2016: failed asylum seeker, Anis Amri steers a hijacked HGV into a Christmas market in 
Breitscheidplatz, Berlin, killing 12, injuring 56.  
 22 March 2017: British Muslim Khalid Masood drives his car into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, 
London, killing five, injuring fifty.  
 7 April 7 2017: Uzbek asylum-seeker Rakhmat Akilov attacks a pedestrianised shopping street in 
Stockholm, Sweden, killing five, injuring fifty.  
 3 June 2017: three Muslim men drive a van into pedestrians on London Bridge before assaulting 
passers-by in a nearby market with knives, killing eight, injuring forty-eight.  
 8 August 8 2017:  Hamou Benlatreche plows his car into a military patrol in Levallois-Perret, Paris, 
injuring six soldiers. 
                                                          
8 Aside from the fact that most of the attackers were under 25 years of age, Perry et al (2017) concluded that, 
because of the diversity of the sample, a profile of lone-actor terrorists in Jerusalem/the West Bank was not 
possible. For example, only 28.5% had prior criminal convictions, and only 12.9% were said to be suffering 




 17 August 2017: a jihadist cell undertakes twin VRAs in Barcelona and Cambrils, Spain. Fifteen 
people were killed and over 130 were injured. 
 6 November 2017: Sayfullo Saipov drove a ‘Home Depot’ truck onto bike paths in Manhattan, 
deliberately targeting bicyclists and pedestrians, before finally driving into a school bus. Eight people 
were killed, eleven injured. 
However, it should not be forgotten that alongside these horrendous attacks a growing number of 
‘non-terrorist’ ramming events also took place in Western cities in 2017 – a great many of which, just 
like in Palestine and Israel, were either spontaneous, chaotically planned, or undertaken by people 
with no previous affiliation with terrorist networks. Once again, when listed, theseev nts make for 
chilling reading: 
 
 20 January 2017: Dimitrious Garagasoulas, a 26-year-old Australian, stabbed his brother (allegedly for 
being gay), then went on a driving rampage across Melbourne, killing 6 people, wounding 30. 
 25 February: a German man armed with a knife drove a rented car into a square in Heidelberg, killing 
one, injuring two.  
 18 May: a US military veteran drove his car into pedestrians in Times Square, New York City in an 
apparent ‘suicide by cop’ attempt, killing one, injuring twenty.  
 29 July: one person was killed and four injured when a drunk man deliberately careered into a group of 
pedestrians in Helsinki, Finland.  
 14 August: Eric Patterson crashed his car into a pizzeria terrace in a small shopping area, killing one 
and injuring thirteen.  
 21 August: a man with a history of petty crime deliberately rammed pedestrians waiting at two separate 
bus stops in Marseilles, France with a stolen white van, killing one, injuring one. 
 10 November: a man deliberately drove his car into a group of Chinese stud nts in Blagnac, France, 
injuring three. 
 2 December: five people were injured in south-west London after a rental car r mmed pedestrians after 
an altercation between occupants of the vehicle and the pedestrians. 
 
Such incidents illustrate that, not only has vehicle ramming spread beyond the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and into Western cities, but that it is now a favoured practice of Jihadists, anti-I l mists, right-
wing Christians, and unbalanced members of the public at large. As Youself Munayyer, Executive 
Director for the US Campaign for Palestinian Rights, suggested in an interview: 
 
The tools that people use to carry out attacks don’t have a religion, trucks don’t have an ideology. They just 
require somebody to drive them… This is a question of utility and opportunity and tactics more than it is 
about ideologies. Israeli settlers have used their cars to run over Palestinian civilians in the West Bank. It’s a 
tactic that can be used by lots of different people. (Munayyer, Cited in Moore 2017) 
 
This is certainly true, but it does not account for why VRAs have emerged as such a popular option t 
this particular moment in history. To understand this development we must look elsewhere. 
 
From nothing to something? Extant explanations 
 
In the face of the spate of VRAs that have occurred in Western cities since 2015, three online articles 
have frequently been held up in the press as both the inspiration behind and the catalyst for this new 




Arabian Peninsula, a feature article appeared entitled ‘The ultimate mowing machine’. The title page 
depicted a Ford F-Series ‘Super Duty’ pickup truck. However, in the Inspire article the original Ford 
slogan - ‘The ultimate towing machine’ – had been changed in a bid to encourage the ‘mowing down’ 
of the enemies of Allah.9 ‘The ultimate mowing machine’ was followed in 2016 and 2017 by two 
similar articles in Rumiyah, an online magazine used by the Islamic State for propaganda and 
recruitment purposes (‘Just terror tactics’, Issue 3, November 2016; and ‘Just terror tactics: truck 
attacks’ Issue 9, May 2017). All three articles encouraged vehicle ramming as an action in which 
lone-actor Jihadists could easily and without suspicion obtain (preferably large) vehicles and then 
target festivals, crowded city centres and other ‘pedestrian only’ areas for maximum destructive 
effect. 
 
[INSERT Figure3 here] 
 
This seemingly straightforward explanation is problematic for a number of reasons. To start with, 
when one examines the publication dates of these articles more closely, their release bears little 
significance to the actual pattern of attacks. For example, if ‘The ultimate mowing machine’ was so 
influential, why did it take more than four years for the first high-profile VRAs to occur in Western 
cities? Indeed, further analysis reveals that the original Inspire article may have itself been inspired by 
a March, 2006 incident in which a man, wanting to ‘avenge the deaths of Muslims around the world’, 
drove a rented Jeep Cherokee SUV into a crowd of people in a busy pedestrian area at the University 
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, injuring nine. Interestingly, this attack was followed just a few weeks 
later by another SUV ramming incident, this time of pedestrians in San Francisco, California, by a 
schizophrenic Afghani immigrant.10 Furthermore, although there was a discernible pulse of VRAs 
following the publication of the ‘Just terror attacks’ article in Rumiyah in November 2016,11 this 
article actually appeared after both the wave of ramming incidents in Israel and the West Bank, and, 
importantly, Europe’s most deadly and most publicised VRA – the July 2016 Bastille Day attack in 
Nice, France, which killed 87 and injured 433.12 Likewise, the May 2017 article was published after 
                                                          
9 The author also suggested welding steel blades to the front of a pickup truck to cause further damage to 
ヮWSWゲデヴｷ;ﾐゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ゲデヴWWデゲ ﾗa WWゲデWヴﾐ IｷデｷWゲが ;SSｷﾐｪ ﾉ;デWヴぎ けTｴｷゲ ｷゲ ﾗﾐW ﾗa ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ┘;┞ゲ デﾗ implement this idea. 
Yﾗ┌ ﾏ;┞ ﾏﾗSｷa┞ ｷデ ;ﾐS ;SS ﾗヴ ゲ┌Hデヴ;Iデ ｷデ ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪﾉ┞ デﾗ ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ ゲ┌ｷデ;HﾉW デﾗ ┞ﾗ┌ヴ ヮ;ヴデｷI┌ﾉ;ヴ IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐゲぐ TWﾉﾉ デｴW 
┘ﾗヴﾉS ┘ｴ┞ ┞ﾗ┌ SｷS ｷデぐげ ふIHヴ;ｴｷﾏ ヲヰヱヰぎヵヴぶく 
10 Our sample reveals a sporadic history of ramming attacks dating back to 1999 (the last year of reliable 
records from the GTD), which includes VRAs by both Palestinians and Israeli Settlers as early as 2001. 
11 For example, on 28th November 2016, Abdul Razak Ali Artan rammed his vehicle into a group of students and 
then stabbed bystanders on the Ohio State University campus in Columbus, Ohio. At least 11 people were 
injured before Artran was shot and killed by a nearby police officer. ISIL subsequently claimed responsibility for 
the incident.  
12 The driver of the white 19-tonne Renault Midlum truck used in Nice was Mohamed Lahouaiej- Bouhlel, a 31-




highly mediated attacks in Berlin, Stockholm and London.13 None of this is to suggest that these three 
now infamous articles have not played an important part in promoting the concept of the VRA, only 
that they should not be seen as causal. If the ‘The ultimate mowing machine’ and the two subsequent 
Rumiyah articles were merely an articulation of an ongoing VRA wave rather than, as some have 
suggested, actually precipitating or causing it, how else might we account for the current popularity of 
this mode of attack? 
 
A second extant explanation relates to situational developments associated with the so-call d ‘security 
hypothesis’ (Farrell et al 2011). In relation to the VRA, the argument would go as follows: because 
situational crime preventionists have successfully ‘reduced the rewards of terrorism’ by physically 
target-hardening structures and situations that traditionally have been the focus of terrorist attacks (the 
most obvious example here being the implementation of airport scanning equipment to combat 
terrorist “skyjackings”), contemporary terrorists have shifted their attention to ‘softer targets’ (e.g. 
unprotected pedestrians) and more mundane methods (e.g. vehicle ramming). No doubt this argument 
has merit. Certainly proponents of the situational approach argue that the shift away rom complex, 
so-called ‘expeditionary terrorism’ (Kilcullen 2009:32) (such as the 1993 and 2001 World Trade 
Centre attacks) towards more ‘parochial, devolved, amateurish, ugly, and uncinematic’ forms of 
terrorism (Cottee, 2017) is evidence of the effectiveness of Crime Prevention through Environmental 
Design (CPtED) and related preventative concepts such as Newman and Clarke’s (2008) ‘EVIL 
DONE’ vulnerability index (Freilich and Newman 2009).14 Yet on closer inspection there is a 
problem. If targeted preventative measures against terrorism have been in position for decades 
(starting with the aforementioned control and regulation of airports in the 1970s, continuing with 
urban counter-terrorist measures such as those deployed against the Irish Republican Army in 
Northern Ireland and London in the 1980s and 1990s, and culminating in the type of technically-
sophisticated target-hardening that has come to define the post-9/11 era cityscape), why is it only in 
the last two years that VRAs have become commonplace?  
 
If the two most prevalent explanations for the rise of the VRA are unsatisfactory, how else might we 
account for this burgeoning phenomenon? Interestingly, there does exist one final, albeit almost 
                                                          
13 It is estimated that less than 1,000 British-registered IP addresses downloaded けTｴW ┌ﾉデｷﾏ;te mowing 
ﾏ;IｴｷﾐWげ article (Fisher, 2012), compared with 54,723 UK downloads of Inspire between 14/10/2014-
12/1/2015. This is important because these later editions contained absolutely no information on VRAs. 
Instead, the practical advice for the would-be terrorist in subsequent Inspire magazines focused on how to 
make car bombs using nails and gas.  
14 Such claims must be tempered by the Achilles heel of CPtED: displacement; a point born out in a recent 
commentary on VRAs by terrorist scholar Brian Jenkins (2017)く AaデWヴ ﾗ┌デﾉｷﾐｷﾐｪ けTWﾐ ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ ﾏｷデｷｪ;デｷﾗﾐ 
ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲげ デﾗ IﾗﾏH;デ motorized assaults ｴW IﾗﾐIﾉ┌SWゲぎ けｷデ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ IﾉW;ヴ デｴ;デ ;ﾐ┞ ﾗa デｴW ゲ┌ｪｪWゲデWS ヮﾗデWﾐデｷ;ﾉ 
security measures would prevent a determined terrorist behind the wheel from driving a bit further to get 




entirely ignored, explanation - not of VRAs per se, but of previous modes of terrorism that also 
appeared to follow a wave/trend-like pattern. Consider, for example, the skyjacking epidemic of the 
late-1960s and early-1970s, a phenomenon that, as Brendan Koerner suggests, has striking similarities 
with today’s ramming situation. 
 
The perpetrators of these crimes often said they were acting to supp rt one of the era’s fashionable 
political causes – the Black Power movement, for example, or the crusade to end the Vietnam War. But 
if you scratched beneath the surface, you often found people in desperat  straits – people like Roger 
Holder, a PTSD-afflicted Vietnam vet who ostensibly hijacked a Western Airlines jet to Algeria as part 
of a convoluted plot to win the freedom of American political activist Angela Davis but was also keen 
to avoid a looming court date for fraud. Or Paul Joseph Sini, an alcoholic loner who claimed to be an 
affiliate of the Irish Republican Army but who really hijacked Air Canada Flight 812 and demanded a 
$1.5 million ransom because he was sick of feeling worthless… When interviewed in prison, many 
hijackers confessed that they’d become intrigued after viewing news footage of stolen planes; when 
they committed their own crimes, they were often mindful of the fact that their exploits would be aired 
to millions. (Koerner, 2016)   
 
The contagion-like nature of skyjacking and other similarly “fashionable” terrorist practices have not 
passed without comment. Holden stressed this very theme in his 1986 article on the subject, while 
Jenkins (1981) demonstrated similar effects with regard to embassy takeovers in the 1970s. More 
generally, Midlarsky, Crenshaw and Yoshida (1980) found a contagion pattern in the spread of 
‘terrorism’ itself, as well as with specific terrorist actions, from national movements in the developing 
world to radical groups in Western Europe. However, in terms of the argument we will develop in the 
remainder of the article, perhaps the most important paper on ‘the contagion effect’ is not on trends in 
terrorist practice per se, but on the (‘copycat’) relationship between heavy media coverage of high-
profile killings and subsequent clusters of violent crimes. Writing in 1971, Berkowitz and Macauley 
established a relationship between several of the more notorious crimes of 1960s America, including 
the JFK assassination, the Richard Speck killing of eight nurses in Chicago in 1966, and the mass 
shooting at the University of Texas in the same year. All these studies, to a greater or lesser degree, 
evoke something that we feel might help explain the current spate of VRAs. This work, for shorthand 
purposes can be incorporated under the umbrella term ‘contagion theory’, an unsung field of study 
which posits that, much like biological contagion, if one person is exposed to a phenomenon (either in 
person or through the media), this can serve as the stimulus for the imitative social actions of another, 
thereby explaining the subsequent (sudden) spatial or temporal clustering of certain social 
phenomena. It is to this body of work that we now turn.  
 
Gabriel Tarde, contagion theory, and the vehicle-ramming attack as a mimetic phenomenon 
 
What is notable, theoretically speaking, about ‘exposure’ or ‘contagion’ as a causal phenomenon is 
that it shifts the analysis and explanation of behaviour away from ‘subjects’ in themselves to 




persons. As Marsden (2005) notes, this shift in emphasis away from an autonomous individual subject 
is one reason mainstream social science has never really taken contagion theory seriously, as any 
approach that seeks to explain adult behavioural patterns via ‘ oc l replication’ undermines the 
traditional, Western, Cartesian understanding of the human subject as an agent defined solely by 
individual intentionality/evaluation. ‘Social contagion’ is thus incompatible with the idea of the self-
contained, rational calculating actor. Such criticism has also been voiced within terrorism studies 
specifically, with the likes of Picard (1986) dismissing the concept of social contagion as a ‘dangerous 
idea backed by dubious science’. Yet might it be time for terrorist researchers and criminologists to do 
what other branches of the social sciences are now doing, and reconsider contagion-like arguments in 
light of the Internet age?15 Certainly, if we consider the speed, intensity, and scope of the wave-like 
spread of VRAs over the last two years, it would seem that, of the currently available explanations, 
the ‘contagion approach’, centred as it is on networked technologies and imitative processes 
associated with ‘the viral’, has much to offer. Indeed, in recent years, the imitative and mimetic 
processes associated with contagion have been reconsidered by ‘digital culture’ scholars interested in 
how information is exchanged and disseminated through the networked technologies of the Internet. 
Most obviously, this body of work has extended the biological metaphor via the use of the terms 
‘viral’ and ‘meme’ (e.g. Sampson 2012; Shifman 2014; Guadagno et al 2013).16  
 
Work on ‘contagion’ has its roots in turn-of-the-century ‘crowd’ theorists such as Gabriel Tarde and 
Gustav le Bon. Tarde (1903, 2010/1888, 2012/1895) in particular is noteworthy here, as his work 
proved to be extremely influential in the early development of sociology, psychology and (lest we 
forget) criminology (Bierne, 1993), both in Europe and North America (Leys, 1993; Kinnunen, 1996). 
More recently, Tarde’s work has found favour not just with scholars examining the viral or mimetic 
nature(s) of the Internet (Sampson 2012; Burgess et al 2017), but also with sociologists of ‘affect’ 
(Blackman 2007), Actor-Network Theorists involved in innovation, diffusion, and science and 
technology studies (Latour 2002), and researchers interested in the spread of new social and politic l 
movements (Marrero-Guillamón 2013). 
 
For Tarde (1903), imitation is a (perhaps the) basic process of the social world. According to his 
thesis, imitation occurs as the by-product of human co-existence, and is a construct he used to develop 
a view of society and social actors that privileges neither individual ‘psychology’ nor deterministic 
                                                          
15 Recent years have seen a significant revival of interest in contagion theory. See e.g. Gould et al (2003) and 
Marsden (1998) on suicide; Christakis and Fowler (2007) on obesity; Patten and Arboleda-Florez (2004) on 
violent group behaviour; Howard and Gengler (2001) on the けWﾏﾗデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾗﾐデ;ｪｷﾗﾐゲげ ﾗa ﾏﾗﾗS ;ﾐS ;ｪｪヴWゲゲion. 
16 けMemesげ are the socio-cultural equivalent of the biological/evolutionary concept of the gene (Dawkins 
1976). The term is used to describe cultural messages which, through the creative and participatory nature of 
Web 2.0, proliferate across social media, while continually being adapted, parodied and reworked (Shifman 




social structures as the primary initiates of social action. Later work on ‘mimesis’ by Walter Benjamin 
also resonated with Tarde, with the German philosopher noting: ‘There is perhaps not a single one of 
his [sic] higher functions in which his [sic] mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role’ (Benjamin 
1999/1933: 720). 
 
Importantly, imitation here does not refer to a process of simple observation and mimicry, but to the 
general openness of human subjectivity to the influence of the surrounding social world – i.e. the 
ability to affect and be affected, consciously and unconsciously, by others (Blackman 2007,2012). 
Accordingly, Tarde’s ‘inter-psychological’ model of subjectivity concentrated on how subjects 
internalise, almost in the manner of hypnotic ‘suggestion’, the ideas, desires, beliefs, emotions, and 
thus behaviours, of others, and then either reject, replicate, or adapt (innovate) them to suit their own 
individual circumstances.  
 
By emphasizing imitation and interaction, Tarde focused attention on the contingent and fluid ature 
of the social as a continual process. At the same time, in place of the concept of ‘individual’, Tarde 
proposed a social ontology of the self as a kind of ‘socialized monad’ (Candea 2016:12); a subject that 
is a reflection (or microcosm) of the social whole and thus inherently open t  change through the 
influence of external factors (Schmidt 2004). So, while ‘ ndividual’ preferences, cognitions and 
decisions exist because of varying biographies of exposure, all of these important elements of the 
decision-making process (and subsequent behavior) are internalized from others as part of the process 
of social interaction and imitation. Thus, social beings are ‘social’ because they internalize the 
external. In Tarde’s own words, social actors deeply influence - or, more accurately, ‘mutually 
possess’ - one another through diverse interactive and imitative processes (Sampson 2012).17  
 
Thus, a society or culture can be seen as being made up of a ‘career of imitations’ that has been 
created through a constant set of individual interactions over time (Marsden 2000). Tarde’s concept of 
imitative innovation helped him explain both the idea (and the origins) of social similarity, and (at the 
same time) the sometimes rapid spread of new ideas, practices, beliefs, tactics and affects through 
populations. In this sense, his work should be seen as an attempt to explain both social stability and 
social change without relying on static/binary notions of the ‘individual’ vs ‘the social’, agency vs 
structure, or subject vs object.  
 
Tarde’s ideas provide an important theoretical contextualisation to research which emphasises the rol  
of ‘exposure’, ‘contagion’ or ‘mimesis’ in the spread of social phenomena. More specifically in terms 
                                                          
17 Such thinking chimes with recent Deleuzian-inspired work on affect/emotion in sociology and the 




of our overall hypothesis, we argue that T rde’s theory of imitation can help us better explain VRAs, 
not only as ‘expressions’ of either structural/ideological or psychological factors, but as social actions 
that have an energy and force all of their own. In the following three short subsections, we suggest 
that Tarde’s thinking can provide a useful starting point for thinking about certain peculiar aspects of 
VRAs: i.e. their ‘wave-like’ pattern of temporal clustering (which inevitably makes us question why 
these attacks suddenly became so popular despite the ready availability of cars and trucks around the 
world for decades), the diversity of perpetrators involved in the attacks, and the often spontaneous 
nature of the incidents.  
 
i. Vehicle ramming as an imitative wave 
 
Although clearly very different social phenomena, VRAs and online events such as viral media 
campaigns, memes, and different forms of online activism/awareness-raising may not be as different 
as one might think. Both exhibit the same wave-like distribution or temporal clustering - a pattern of 
inactivity, a rapid increase in take-up, interest or diffusion (usually on a profoundly international 
scale), and finally a longer, but still rapid, drop-off in participation. For example, this typical pattern 
of wave-like temporal clustering was demonstrated when seventeen million people participated in the 
‘Ice bucket challenge’, an imitative meme which captured global attention and participation for a brief 
period in 2014. 
 
Such patterned spontaneity would doubtless have fascinated Tarde. In his day, he was struck by how 
quickly innovations, ideas, fashions, technologies, and crimes could be diffused throughout a 
population or a crowd. Moreover, he realised the importance of the new communication technologies 
of his time - newspapers, railways, the telegraph etc. - in promoting the increasingly rapid 
transmission of ideas across dispersed populations (Barry and Thrift 2007). It was these technologi s, 
especially the media, that turned localised ‘crowds’ into dispersed ‘publics’, subsequently 
transforming an imitative process that was once spatially clustered, into a ‘contagion without contact’ 
(Tarde 1901:11, cited in Gibbs 2008) in which the suggestibility of publics was demonstrated by 
temporal clustering of social phenomena.  
 
This process of diffusion, exposure, connection and influence became the contemporary social fact for 
Tarde, and these ‘pulses’ or ‘waves’ of innovation, change or action are what he sought to explain in 
his work. 
 
Social things, which maintain and perpetuate themselves by the individual consciousness’s through which 
they evolve, are like an ocean wave, which crosses innumerable molecules and seems to animate them even 





Tarde wasn’t interested in the ‘subject’ so much as with the interactive processes that (he felt) 
modified individuals, and thus created similarities among them. He was therefore not focused on 
‘individual’ persons per se, nor with societal structures, but with the force of micro-actions (be it 
ideas, fashions, behaviours, communications, emotions) which, he claimed, move through social life 
not unlike the flow of an ocean wave (Sampson 2012). While waves have their origins in individual 
events, they also gain their own momentum and force, a force which can be dissipated or amplified, 
and can even merge with other waves. Tarde saw the events of social life as analogous: having their 
origins in the creativity of specific individual actions, but also gaining their own momentum - what he 
called an ‘imitative radiation’ that created ‘lines of force which traverse the individual person’ (Barry 
2006:54). This suggests a view of social phenomena themselves as vitalistic forces which emerge 
through relationality and encounter.  
 
Such an ‘imitative radiation’ is apparent, for example, in Towers et al (2015) recent study of mass 
killings and school shootings in the US. Applying a ‘contagion model’ to recent datasets of firearm 
incidents that left 4 or more people killed, Towers et al concluded that there is ‘significant evidence’ 
that these incidents ‘are incented by similar events in the immediate past’ – with the ‘temporary 
increase in probability’ lasting 13 days. This ‘contagion effect’, they argue, is due in large part to 
intense cycles of media coverage of these shootings that prolong and diffuse the event among 
dispersed populations. It is a sentiment echoed in recent commentary on VRAs: 
 
The fact that this has been broadcast, the attacks in Nice and Berlin have been shown so many times in 
the international media, simply had the effect of drawing the attention of people that this is an effective 
instrument… People copy, people imitate, you see it coming and going… (Uzi Arad, Israel’s National 
Security Council, quoted in Moore 2017) 
 
These waves of imitative radiation are evident both internationally (where globalramming incidents 
have gone from insignificance to over forty per year within two years) and at a more localized, micro-
level. For example, on the 21st  December 2014, 11 civilians were injured in Dijon, France, when a 
mentally unstable “40-year-old man of Arab origin” used a Transit-style van as a weapon in five parts 
of the city in the space of thirty minutes. Within 24 hours, a Frenchman, with a history of petty crime, 
alcoholism, and mental health issues drove his van into shoppers at a Christmas market in Nantes, 
injuring 10. He then stabbed himself 13 times in the chest with a knife. Authorities believe he had no 
political or religious motive, but was directly inspired by the Dijon incident the previous evening 
(Lichfield 2014). Likewise, the inspiration for Osbourne’s June 2017 attack on the Finsbury Mosque 
can be traced (in large part) to his desire for revenge for the London Bridge attack sixteen days before. 
Interestingly, the Osbourne attack was then itself copied just four days later by Marek Zakarocki, a 
Polish immigrant to the UK and ‘Britain First’ supporter, who allegedly shouted ‘I am going to kill a 




house. Six days later, a Frenchman, also wanting to avenge recent Islamic-St te attacks in Paris, was 
arrested after driving his car into a crowd in front of a mosque in a Paris suburb. 
 
At the most basic explanatory level, then, Tarde’s ideas provide an interesting, tentative framework 
for thinking about the rapid rise and spread of VRAs from an exceedingly rare practice just three 
years ago, to something now occurring with alarming frequency in countries across the globe. 
However, these examples not only highlight the wave-li k  clustering of VRAs, but also the diversity 
of the perpetrators involved in terms of their motives, ideologies and individual circumstance . In the 
next section, we demonstrate how such diversity can also be explained using Tardian theory. 
 
ii. Imitation, anti-structure, and the diversity of VRA perpetrators 
 
According to Tarde (1903), it is the imitation process, rather than social structures, that provides the 
basis for both the socialisation and the actions of individuals. Hence, the social is not a fixed ent ty, 
but is continually (re)made through transmissions/processes, and the resultant actions of imitation, 
opposition, and adaptation (Burgess et al 2017). This ‘anti-structural’ and ‘anti-individual’ approach 
to the origins of human behaviour is useful when we consider the diverse motivations of vehicle 
rammers.  
 
Previously, we observed how VRAs spread (in short order) from the Palestinian conflict to Jihadist 
attacks in Western cities, ultimately encompassing a diverse array of attackers with a variety of 
motives. We similarly noted that even within the narrower confines of the ‘Intifada of Individuals’, it 
was clear from commentary on both sides that the Palestinian perpetrators had little in common in 
terms of their motivation (David 2016; Pfeffer 2016). Figure 4 illustrates this spread of perpetrators 
over time from an almost exclusively Palestinian practice, to Jihadists in Western cities, to people 
form a variety of backgrounds and motives.  
 
[INSERT Figure 4 here] 
 
Many, but not all, VRA perpetrators were inspired by some sense of injustice towards either 
Palestinians or Muslims. Others were not Muslims at all but instead wanted to avenge jhadist attacks. 
Some, but not all, suffered from a history of mental health problems. Some had histories of petty 
violence, some did not. Others merely wanted to kill themselves. Focusing more closely on 2017 
sharply illustrates this diversity. Of the 42 VRAs we catalogued in that year, ten were perpetrat d by 
Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank, and another ten were attributed to Jihadists. Four incidents 
were related to the ramming of (left-wing) protestors; four attributed to ‘revenge’ against Muslims; 




those with either no clear motivation, mental health issues, or aspirations of suicide. This is notable 
because when we conceptualize a ‘wave’ of ramming attacks, the tendency is to gloss over the act 
itself and to look instead at its ‘cause’, either in terms of individual psychology or the social structures 
and ideologies that surround the individual. Too often in the analysis of terrorism, the act itself is 
rarely considered relevant, apart from being a means either to demonstrate an ideological goal, or to 
express the will of an individual, sane or otherwise. This in turn leads one to see ‘cause’ in a shared 
ideology, or a common individual alienation or mental illness. Of course, these are relevant, but why 
not also consider the material act itself? 
 
Given the eclecticism of vehicle rammers in terms of personal/ideological motivation, it seems 
reasonable to pay attention to the one thing that unites their actions – the attack mode: the ‘style’, the 
instruments (cars, trucks, knives) involved, and the exposure to similar actions conducted by others 
through mass media and the Internet. To see the attack exclusively as an expression of individual 
psychology, or larger ideological/structural ‘social facts’, is to potentially miss out on the power of the 
act itself to inspire and to be worth imitating, either meticulously or more spontaneously. 
 
iii. Vehicle ramming and emotional contagion: mimesis and the contemporary mediascape 
 
As discussed above, in terms of their biographies, relationships to organised terrorist groups, and lack 
of planning, a considerable number of contemporary vehicle rammers contradict the established 
blueprint of the ideologically committed, well-organised terrorist actor. These observations resonate 
with the findings of the Israeli National institute for Security Studies which suggested that the 
perpetrators of the ‘Intifada of Individuals’ were not typical of previous ‘intifadas’ in that they were 
largely ‘lone wolf’ assailants, often with no previous history of political violence and no established 
links with existing terrorist organisations. Instead, they were diverse individuals driven by different 
personal circumstances who were ‘inspired by the media (the internet, television, and the press), 
which provided them with illustrations of the injustice that Israel commits against the Palestinians and 
sparked them to take action’ (David 2016). 
 
This is particularly prescient to a contemporary digital media culture in which the notion of 
‘exposure’ to the acts of others has become extremely complicated. While contagion research in the 
1970s demonstrated how the proliferation of broadcast media brought with  a new age of copy-cat 
crimes and terrorist inspiration, the move to a decentralised, networked, interactive mediascape has 
created an even more complicated, uncontrollable and immersive media experience. Such 
environments provide almost continual, instantaneous exposure to th  acts and experiences of others 
around the world. Castells (1996) famously referred to this technologically-enabled, networked 




reasonable to suggest that processes like ‘contagion’ become markedly more significant i  a space of 
flows that allows for so many vectors of ‘exposure’, so many acts to imitate, and so many emotions 
with which to resonate and rationalize one’s action. Not without relevance here is recent work that 
examines so-called ‘emotional contagion’ (Neumann and Strack 2000; Howard and Gengler 2001), 
which demonstrates how exposure to the emotional states of others, affect one’s own emotional mood 
or position. The most notorious illustration f this was the Facebook ‘emotional contagion’ 
experiment of 2012 (Kramer tal 2014), which found that people’s moods closely mirrored the 
moods of others around them, even in non-proximal, online environments. Indeed, Gibbs (2008) sees 
social media in particular, with its technological capacities for connection and social influence as ‘the 
locus par excellence of imitation which imagines itself to be original’ (ibid: 138) and in that sense 
contributes to the production of an affective ‘mimetic field’, which again, can be demonstrated in the 
intensive, wave-like nature of much online social phenomena. 
 
Such a ‘mimetic field’ for car-based violence has also been articulated in the US through several 
popular memes in recent years. ‘Run them over’ was a saying which spread through comments 
sections on YouTube videos, blogposts, and news stories depicting confrontations between frustrated 
drivers and ‘Black lives matter’ protestors on the streets of American cities. In February 2017, the 
‘All lives splatter’ meme (Figure 5) emerged out of the ‘Take America back’ Facebook page and was 
widely disseminated through right-wing websites (Grabar 2017). Similar sentiments and incidents18 
were replicated in a cluster of YouTube videos all encouraging or celebrating the ramming of left-
wing protesters in both the run-up to and the aftermath of the Charlottesville VRA in August 2017.19 
In total, we found six incidents of vehicle ramming involving the targeting of protestors in 2016 and 
2017. 
 
[INSERT Figure 5 here] 
 
The haphazard, lone-operator nature of VRAs, and the often sudden lurch towards violence, both 
highlight the contingent nature of attacker’s identities and the usefulness of Tarde’s more fluid notion 
of the individual as monad - something always in formation as it internalises the external world. Such 
thinking inevitably differentiates Tarde’s ‘imitative’ approach from rational choice or media ‘effects’ 
conceptions that rely on a self-nclosed, ‘Cartesian’ notion of the subject. More problematically in 
                                                          
18 The Charlottesville ramming was preceded by at least three ramming incidents targeting BLM protestors: 
January 6, 2015, in South Minneapolis, MN; July 8, 2016 outside the Ferguson police station, St Louis, MO; July 
11, 2016 in Carbondale, IL. In this last incident, the driver stopped in front of the protesters, emerged from his 
┗WｴｷIﾉW ;ﾐS ゲｴﾗ┌デWS けAﾉﾉ ﾉｷ┗Wゲ ﾏ;デデWヴが ﾐﾗデ Hﾉ;Iﾆゲが ;ﾉﾉ ﾉｷ┗Wゲげが HWaﾗヴW returning to his vehicle, and driving into the 
protesters (KFVS 2016).  




terms of prevention and risk-assessment, this view of the late modern terrorist as an unbounded 
subject continually open to internalising and emulating external influences and acts, does much to 
undermine the static notions of ‘identity’ behind the psychologically-constructed ‘personality types’ 
popular with twentieth-century terrorism researchers. 
 
For some, this detour into digital culture studies and contagion theory will seem unnecessary. 
However, to adopt such a position would be to ignore the fact that the entire history of twentieth-
century terrorism has itself been the subject of a wave-like metaphor. Here we refer to Rapop rt’s 
(2004) much-cited categorisation of four historical waves of modern terrorism.20 According to 
Rapoport, each ‘wave’ had a distinct ‘energy’ which influenced the formation of new groups under 
particular ideologies. Indeed, if we consider J.D Simon’s (2011) recent augmentation of the Rapoport 
framework, his emerging ‘fifth wave’ of terrorism draws even more parallels. Most obviously, Simon 
asserts that the next wave of terror will be undertaken not by highly coordinated terrorist group with 
clearly demarcated political or religious objectives, but by ‘lone-operator’ terrorists. Moreover, these 
actors will plan their acts and distribute their message via digital technologies; hence Simon’s 
description of this new era as  ‘technological’ wave whose ‘energy’ will come from its ability to 
spread information, tactics, awareness, radical ideas, and perhaps even emotional contagion throu h 
the diverse vectors of the Internet. This being the case, it would seem that many of the sociological 
theories currently being used to understand memes, virals, and other digital phenomena are likely to 




The same night Osbourne committed his attack outside the Finsbury Park Mosque, Djaziri Adam 
Lotfi, an IS supporter on a French terrorist watch list, ploughed his car into Gendarmerie on the 
Champs Elysees. A few days later, in an attack that closely mirrors the Osbourne incident, a 
disgruntled Frenchman was arrested while attempting to drive his car into a crowd near a Mosque in 
suburban Paris. Like Osbourne, he too wasseeking to avenge recent Islamic-State attacks. Such 
incidents illustrate the appeal of vehicle ramming as a means of symbolic violence; a form of attack as 
likely to be employed by an Islamic State supporter as by an organisationally unaffiliated, disgruntled 
loner. In short, just as car bombing brought about the ‘enfranchisement of marginal actors in history’ 
(Davis, 2007:11), vehicle ramming has further democratised terrorism to the point where, as Cottee 
(2017) suggests, it now ‘just requires a willingness to kill and die. Indeed, just about any village idiot 
                                                          
20 The anarchist wave (late nineteenth and early twentieth century); the anti-colonialist wave (1920s-1960s); 




can aspire to become a martyr to a cause that politically makes no real sense and that they barely 
understand’.  
 
But even though VRAs have transformed the Western terrorist act into something more akin to a 
misdirected ‘crime of passion’ than an act of ‘expeditionary terrorism’, it is likely that the current 
spate of VRAs will eventually subside just as other wave or trend-like terrorist phenomena have done 
in the past. This is not to suggest that the lat st ‘fifth’ wave of terrorism is petering out. On the 
contrary. Our point is that, even if we do see a marked decline in vehicle ramming (as was the case 
with ‘the intifada of individuals’), another equally tawdry and devolved form of violence will quickly 
emerge to take its place. Indeed, our media-saturated, networked society makes such waves not just 
likely, but inevitable. Not only will the next democratised terrorist methodology be wid ly available 
to view and download on an array of digital formats, but more worryingly, online ‘filter bubbles’ and 
other forms of personalised digital isolation will continue to intensify the ongoing c flation of 
personal and political grievances that is the product of online hate speech and weaponised identity 
politics. In previous decades, terrorists required both a viable (successful) tactical exemplar and a 
warrant from a credible/worthy organisation before embarking on an action. Today, the former is only 
a meme away, and the latter no longer needed. Such a situation demands that criminologists and 
terrorism scholars play closer attention to developing terrorist trends. But documenting the frequency 
and diffusion patterns of whatever practice follows in the wake of vehicle ramming will not be 
enough. We must also take a page from Tarde’s book and acknowledge that certain high-profile acts 
have a relational energy and imitative force all of their own. Only then, when we have given the 
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Figure 4: VRA perpetrators by group (2010-2017)  
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